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This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which
aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse off when the worth of the grand coalition
increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by
a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which
includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a
unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off
when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no
other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).
Keywords: TU-games, aggregate monotonicity, coalitional monotonicity, egalitarian
core, strong egalitarian core, egalitarian stability
JEL classification: C71
1 Introduction
A transferable utility game models cooperative situations where players generate joint rev-
enues while being able to act in coalitions. One of the main issues is to allocate the joint
revenues, the worth of the grand coalition, among the cooperating players. The most famous
solution, the Shapley (1953) value, which assigns an average of all marginal contributions,
generally violates a central stability principle: it does not necessarily select from the core
when this is possible. This means that it may conflict coalitional rationality, a strengthening
of individual rationality which says that no coalition can be better off by itself. However, for
the specific class of convex games (cf. Shapley (1971)), the Shapley value is a core selector.
A solution that satisfies core selection on the class of all games with nonempty core is
the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969)), which asssigns the imputation that lexicographically
minimizes the excesses of all coalitions. However, Megiddo (1974) showed that the nucleo-
lus violates an elementary solidarity principle ensuring that no player is worse off when the
worth of the grand coalition increases, i.e. it violates aggregate monotonicity. Hokari (2000a)
showed that the nucleolus even violates aggregate monotonicity on the class of convex games.
However, a modification of the nucleolus, the so-called per-capita nucleolus, satisfies aggre-
gate monotonicity and core selection on the class of all games with nonempty core. Calleja
et al. (2009) studied the aggregate monotonic core, the set of all allocations that can be
assigned by solutions satisfying aggregate monotonicity and core selection.
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The Shapley (1953) value even satisfies the stronger property coalitional monotonicity,
which requires that no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases. Young
(1985) and Housman and Clark (1998) showed that coalitional monotonicity and core selec-
tion are incompatible on the class of all games with nonempty core. Needless to say, these
properties are compatible on the class of convex games.
The principle of egalitarianism stems from the belief that all humans are fundamentally
equal and should be treated as equally as possible. This is often justified on the basis of a
thought experiment where members of a society decide upon moral issues behind the veil of
ignorance, i.e. without being aware of their identity and characteristics a priori. A standard
measure for egalitarianism in economic distributions is the Lorenz criterion. An allocation
Lorenz dominates another allocation if the former cumulatively assigns to each subgroup of
ex post poorest agents more than the latter does.
In the context of coalitional games, the Lorenz dominating allocation of the worth of the
grand coalition is equal division. This is not really satisfactory since it does not take the
economic opportunities of subcoalitions into account. Instead, motivated by a coherent use
of egalitarian norms, Dutta and Ray (1989) studied the Lorenz undominated elements of the
so-called Lorenz core. Remarkably, and particularly because the Lorenz core is not closed,
such element is unique whenever it exists, despite the partial ordering induced by the Lorenz
criterion. Unfortunately, existence of the Dutta and Ray (1989) solution is not guaranteed.
However, for convex games, it exists, belongs to the core, and Lorenz dominates any other
core allocation. Moreover, Hokari (2000b) showed that it satisfies coalitional monotonicity.
Recently, Calleja et al. (2019) axiomatically characterized the Dutta and Ray (1989) solution
for convex games using aggregate monotonicity.
In search for a larger domain of existence to extend the potential range of applications,
Dutta and Ray (1991) studied the Lorenz undominated elements of the equal division core.
Although existence is guaranteed under mild conditions, such element is not necessarily
unique, even for convex games. Uniqueness on the class of convex games is guaranteed
for the Lorenz undominated elements of the core (cf. Hougaard et al. (2001)), to which
we refer as the strong egalitarian core. This set is nonempty for all games with nonempty
core and boils down to the Dutta and Ray (1989) solution on the class of convex games.
Alternatively, the strong egalitarian core can be described as the set of core allocations for
which no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players.
The larger egalitarian core (cf. Arin and Iñarra (2001)) consists of all core allocations for
which no other core allocation can be obtained by a single transfer from a richer to a poorer
player.
Several selectors of the (strong) egalitarian core for the class of all games with nonempty
core have been proposed in the literature. The Lmin solution (cf. Arin and Iñarra (2001))
assigns the core allocation which lexicographically maximizes the minimal payoffs. The
Lmax solution (cf. Arin et al. (2003)) assigns the core allocation which lexicographically
minimizes the maximal payoffs. The least squares solution (cf. Arin et al. (2008)) assigns the
core allocation which minimizes the sum of squared payoffs. The coalitional Nash solution
(cf. Compte and Jehiel (2010)) assigns the core allocation which maximizes the product of
payoffs. However, these solutions do not inherit the monotonicity properties of the Dutta
and Ray (1989) solution for convex games.
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This paper studies the compatibility of aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selec-
tion. On the class of convex games, egalitarian core selection characterizes the Dutta and Ray
(1989) solution, which satisfies aggregate monotonicity. On the class of equal division stable
games, i.e. games where the core contains equal division of the worth of the grand coalition,
aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selection characterize the equal division solu-
tion. However, on the class of all games with nonempty core, aggregate monotonicity and
egalitarian core selection are incompatible. This means that the aggregate monotonic egali-
tarian core, the set of all allocations that can be assigned by solutions satisfying aggregate
monotonicity and egalitarian core selection, is empty.
We identify the maximal domain of games on which aggregate monotonicity and egal-
itarian core selection are compatible. In other words, we identify the maximal domain of
games for which the aggregate monotonic egalitarian core is nonempty. This turns out to be
the class of egalitarian stable games, i.e. games for which the procedural egalitarian solution
(cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2017)) selects from the core. This class not only contains all
convex games and all equal division stable games, but also all games with a large core (cf.
Sharkey (1982)). Interestingly, on this class, aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core
selection characterize the Lmax solution, which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity and
strong egalitarian core selection. This means that the aggregate monotonic egalitarian core
for egalitarian stable games is single-valued.
Our results at least imply that the Lmax solution is from a monotonicity perspective
more appealing than the Lmin solution, the least squares solution, and the coalitional Nash
solution. This complements the conclusions of Llerena and Mauri (2016), where an approach
based on consistency leads to the Lmax solution.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some preliminary notions and nota-
tions for monotonicity and egalitarianism in transferable utility games. Section 3 studies the
compatibility of aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selection. Section 4 formulates
some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
LetN be a nonempty and finite set. Denote 2N = {S | S ⊆ N}. For any x ∈ RN , let x ∈ R|N |
be obtained from x by permuting its coordinates in such a way that x1 ≤ . . . ≤ x|N |. For any





for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. For any x, y ∈ RN , x Lmin dominates y, denoted by x Lmin y, if
there is k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} such that xk > yk and x` = y` for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. For any
x, y ∈ RN , x Lmax dominates y, denoted by x Lmax y, if there is k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} such
that (−x)k > (−y)k and (−x)` = (−y)` for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
A transferable utility game, or simply game, is a pair (N, v), where N is a nonempty and
finite set of players and v : 2N → R assigns to each coalition S ∈ 2N its worth such that
v(∅) = 0. Let TUNall denote the class of all games with player set N . For convenience, a game
is denoted by v ∈ TUNall. Throughout this paper, TU
N denotes a generic class of games.
Let v ∈ TUN . The core C(v) ⊆ RN consists of all allocations which distribute the worth













The egalitarian core EC(v) ⊆ RN (cf. Arin and Iñarra (2001)) consists of all core allocations










The strong egalitarian core SEC(v) ⊆ RN (cf. Hougaard et al. (2001)) consists of all core





∣∣ ∀y∈C(v) : y Lor x} .
Note that SEC(v) ⊆ EC(v) ⊆ C(v). Moreover, SEC(v) 6= ∅ if C(v) 6= ∅. The game v is
balanced if C(v) 6= ∅, and convex (cf. Shapley (1971)) if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T )
for all S, T ∈ 2N . Let TUNbal denote the class of all balanced games and let TU
N
conv denote





A solution f : TUN → RN assigns to any game v ∈ TUN a payoff allocation f(v) ∈ RN .
Throughout this paper, f denotes a generic solution.
A solution satisfies aggregate monotonicity if no player is worse off when the worth of
the grand coalition increases, and coalitional monotonicity if no member is worse off when
the worth of one coalition increases. Note that coalitional monotonicity implies aggregate
monotonicity.
Aggregate monotonicity
f(v) ≤ f(v′) for all v, v′ ∈ TUN with v(N) ≤ v′(N) and v(S) = v′(S) for all S ⊂ N .
Coalitional monotonicity
fS(v) ≤ fS(v′) for all v, v′ ∈ TUN with v(S) ≤ v′(S) and v(T ) = v′(T ) for all T ∈ 2N \ {S}.
A solution satisfies egalitarian core selection if it is an element of the egalitarian core,
and strong egalitarian core selection if it is an element of the strong egalitarian core. Note
that strong egalitarian core selection implies egalitarian core selection.
Egalitarian core selection
f(v) ∈ EC(v) for all v ∈ TUN .
Strong egalitarian core selection
f(v) ∈ SEC(v) for all v ∈ TUN .
The following solutions for balanced games satisfy strong egalitarian core selection. The
Lmin solution Lmin : TUNbal → RN (cf. Arin and Iñarra (2001)) assigns to any balanced





∣∣ ∀y∈C(v) : y Lmin x} .
The Lmax solution Lmax : TUNbal → RN (cf. Arin et al. (2003)) assigns to any balanced





∣∣ ∀y∈C(v) : y Lmax x} .
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The least squares solution LS : TUNbal → RN (cf. Arin et al. (2008)) assigns to any balanced






The coalitional Nash solution CN : TUNbal → RN (cf. Compte and Jehiel (2010)) assigns to








Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let v ∈ TUNbal be given by
v(S) =

24 if S = {1, 2, 3, 4};
14 if S ∈ {{2, 4}, {3, 4}};
0 otherwise.
The Lmin solution is given by Lmin(v) = (5, 5, 5, 9). The Lmax solution is given by
Lmax(v) = (3, 7, 7, 7). The least squares solution is given by LS(v) = (4, 6, 6, 8). The









On the class of convex games, all these solutions coincide with the Dutta and Ray (1989)
solution. A solution which extends the Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for convex games
to all games is the procedural egalitarian solution (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2017)). This
solution is defined on the basis of an iterative procedure in which intercoalitional egalitarian
considerations are central.
The procedural egalitarian solution
Let v ∈ TUNall. Define P v,0 = ∅. Let k ∈ N. The function χv,k assigns to each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}
the payoff allocation χv,k(S) ∈ RS defined by
χv,ki (S) =
{






|S\Pv,k−1| if i ∈ S \ P
v,k−1.
The collection Av,k ⊆ 2N \ {∅} is defined by
Av,k =
{
S ∈ 2N \ {∅}
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
χv,ki (S) = v(S),∀i∈S∀T∈2N :i∈T : χ
v,k





The set P v,k ∈ 2N \ {∅} is defined by P v,k =
⋃
S∈Av,k S. The vector γ
v,k ∈ RPv,k is defined
by γv,ki = χ
v,k
i (S) for all i ∈ P v,k, where S ∈ Av,k and i ∈ S.
1Formally, the coalitional Nash solution is not well-defined for all balanced games, but this definition
suffices for our purposes.
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The iteration nv ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} is defined by nv = min{k ∈ N | P v,k = N}. The vector of
egalitarian claims γ̂v ∈ RN is defined by γ̂v = γv,nv . The collection of egalitarian admissible
coalitions Âv ⊆ 2N \ {∅} is defined by Âv = Av,nv . The set of strong egalitarian claimants
Dv ∈ 2N is defined by Dv =
⋂
{S ∈ Âv | ∀T∈Âv : S 6⊂ T}. The procedural egalitarian
solution PES(v) ∈ RN is defined by
PES(v) =
(
(γ̂vi )i∈Dv , (min{γ̂vi , λ})i∈N\Dv
)
,
where λ ∈ R is such that
∑
i∈N PESi(v) = v(N).
The egalitarian procedure underlying the procedural egalitarian solution starts dividing the
worth of each coalition equally among its members. The payoff of a player in a coalition is
fixed if none of its members is allocated a higher payoff in any other coalition. In the next
iteration, each such player is allocated this fixed payoff in each coalition and the remaining
worth is equally divided among the other members. Again, the payoff of a player in a coalition
is fixed if none of its members is allocated a higher payoff in any other coalition. This process
continues until all players have a fixed payoff. The fixed payoffs are called the egalitarian
claims and the coalitions in which they are attainable are called egalitarian admissible.
Members of all inclusion-wise maximal egalitarian admissible coalitions are called strong
egalitarian claimants. The procedural egalitarian solution assigns to the strong claimants
their claims and divides the remaining worth of the grand coalition as equally as possible
among the other players provided that they are not allocated more than their claims.
Example 2
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let v ∈ TUNbal be the game from Example 1. The following table
presents the egalitarian procedure underlying the procedural egalitarian solution.
S {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
v(S) 14 14 24
χv,1(S) (·, 7, ·, 7) (·, ·, 7, 7) (6, 6, 6, 6)
χv,2(S) (·,7, ·,7) (·, ·,7,7) (3,7,7,7)





Then nv = 2, γ̂v = (3, 7, 7, 7), Âv = {{2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Dv = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the
procedural egalitarian solution is given by PES(v) = (3, 7, 7, 7). 4
In Example 2, the procedural egalitarian solution coincides with the Lmax solution. This
is not the case in general.
Example 3
Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let v ∈ TUNbal be given by
v(S) =
{
4 if S ∈ {{1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}};
0 otherwise.
Then nv = 1, γ̂v = (2, 2, 2), Âv = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}, Dv = {3}, and PES(v) = (1, 1, 2). On
the other hand, Lmin(v) = Lmax(v) = LS(v) = CN(v) = (0, 0, 4). 4
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j = v(S). In fact, since a player’s payoff is the lowest among all members of the
corresponding coalitions when it is fixed for the first time, for each i ∈ N there is an S ∈ 2N




j = v(S) and γ̂
v
i ≤ γ̂vj for all j ∈ S. All such coalitions are
contained in the collection of egalitarian admissible coalitions
Âv =
{






In games where the grand coalition is egalitarian admissible, all players are strong claimants,
and the procedural egalitarian solution assigns to all players their claims. Such games are
called egalitarian stable.
Egalitarian stability
v ∈ TUN is egalitarian stable if N ∈ Âv.
A game is egalitarian stable if and only if the procedural egalitarian solution selects from







all. For games with one or two players, egalitarian stability is equivalent to
balancedness and convexity. For games with more than two players, the three notions differ
from each other, e.g. the game in Example 2 is egalitarian stable but not convex, and the
game in Example 3 is balanced but not egalitarian stable. Like balanced games and convex
games, the class of egalitarian stable games is closed under increment of the worth of the
grand coalition. In fact, like balancedness, egalitarian stability is a prosperity property (cf.
Van Gellekom et al. (1999)), i.e. any game becomes egalitarian stable when the worth of the
grand coalition is sufficiently increased.
3 Monotonicity and Egalitarianism
This section studies the compatibility of aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selec-
tion for solutions for transferable utility games. For all games with one player, egalitarian
core selection simply implies an efficient allocation of the worth of the grand coalition, which
is aggregate monotonic. For all balanced games with two players, egalitarian core selection
characterizes constrained egalitarianism (cf. Dutta (1990)), the solution which divides the
worth of the grand coalition as equally as possible subject to individual rationality, which is
aggregate monotonic. On the class of balanced games with three or more players, aggregate
monotonicity and egalitarian core selection are incompatible. This is shown by the following
example.
Example 4
Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let v ∈ TUNbal be the game from Example 3. Then EC(v) = {(0, 0, 4)}.
Let v′ ∈ TUNbal be given by
v′(S) =
{
v(S) + 2 if S = {1, 2, 3};
v(S) otherwise.
Then EC(v′) = {(2, 2, 2)}. This means that aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core
selection are incompatible on the class of balanced games. 4
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However, on several subclasses of balanced games, aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian
core selection are compatible. For instance, on the class of convex games, the Dutta and
Ray (1989) solution satisfies coalitional monotonicity and strong egalitarian core selection.
Moreover, it is characterized by egalitarian core selection.
Another subclass of balanced games on which aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian
core selection are compatible is the class of equal division stable games, i.e. games where the
core contains equal division of the worth of the grand coalition. The equal division solution
ED : TUNall → RN assigns to any game v ∈ TU
N
all the allocation which equally divides the









v ∈ TUN is equal division stable if ED(v) ∈ C(v).







all. Clearly, on the class of equal division stable games, the equal division
solution satisfies coalitional monotonicity and strong egalitarian core selection. In fact, it is
characterized by strong egalitarian core selection. However, as the following example shows,
it is not characterized by egalitarian core selection.
Example 5
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let v ∈ TUNeds be given by
v(S) =

4 if S = {1, 2, 3, 4};
2 if S ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}};
0 otherwise.
Then EC(v) = conv({(1, 1, 1, 1), (0, 0, 2, 2)}). This means that egalitarian core selection does
not characterize a unique solution on the class of equal division stable games. 4
If we impose aggregate monotonicity in addition to egalitarian core selection, we do obtain
a full axiomatic characterization of the equal division solution on the class of equal division
stable games.
Theorem 3.1
The equal division solution is the unique solution for equal division stable games satisfying
aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selection.
Proof. Clearly, the equal division solution satisfies coalitional monotonicity and strong egal-
itarian core selection on the class of equal division stable games. Let f : TUNeds → RN be
a solution for equal division stable games satisfying aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian
core selection. Let v ∈ TUNeds. Suppose that f(v) 6= ED(v). Then fi(v) > EDi(v) for some









< ξ < max
i∈N
fi(v).
Define v′ ∈ TUNeds by
v′(S) =
{∑
i∈R fi(v) + |N \R|ξ if S = N ;
v(S) otherwise.
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Then v′(N) > v(N). By aggregate monotonicity, f(v′) ≥ f(v). Moreover, fi(v′) > fi(v) for






fj(v) ≥ v(S) = v′(S).
By egalitarian core selection, this means that fi(v
′) ≤ fj(v′) for all i, j ∈ N with fi(v′) >
fi(v). This implies that fi(v
′) = fi(v) > ξ for all i ∈ R, and fi(v′) = ξ for all i ∈ N \R. For












′) > v′(S) for all S ⊂ N with S ∩ R 6= ∅. This contradicts that f
satisfies egalitarian core selection. Hence, f(v) = ED(v).
Example 6
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let v ∈ TUNeds be the game from Example 5. Let ε > 0 and let
v′ ∈ TUNeds be given by
v′(S) =
{
v(S) + 4ε if S = {1, 2, 3, 4};
v(S) otherwise.
Then EC(v′) = {(1 + ε, 1 + ε, 1 + ε, 1 + ε)}. 4
On the class of convex games, the Dutta and Ray (1989) solution coincides with the
procedural egalitarian solution. On the class of equal division stable games, the equal division
solution coincides with the procedural egalitarian solution. In fact, on any domain of games
which is closed under increment of the worth of the grand coalition, all solutions satisfying
aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selection assign the egalitarian claims to the
players. This is described by the following key lemma.
Lemma 3.1
Let TUN be a domain of games which is closed under increment of the worth of the grand
coalition. If a solution f : TUN → RN satisfies aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core
selection, then f(v) = γ̂v for all v ∈ TUN .
Proof. Let f : TUN → RN be a solution satisfying aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian
core selection. Let v ∈ TUN . Define Q0 = ∅ and Qk = {i ∈ N | ∀j∈N\Qk−1 : γ̂vj ≤ γ̂vi } for all
k ∈ N. Then Qk−1 ⊆ Qk for all k ∈ N and Qk = N for all k ≥ |N |. We show by induction
that maxi∈N\Qk−1 fi(v) ≤ maxi∈N\Qk−1 γ̂vi and fQk(v) = γ̂vQk for all k ∈ N. Suppose that
maxi∈N fi(v) > maxi∈N γ̂
v










< ξ1 < max
i∈N
fi(v).
Define v1 ∈ TUN by
v1(S) =
{∑
i∈R1 fi(v) + |N \R1|ξ1 if S = N ;
v(S) otherwise.
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Then v1(N) > v(N). By aggregate monotonicity, f(v1) ≥ f(v). Moreover, fi(v1) > fi(v)





fj(v) ≥ v(S) = v1(S).
By egalitarian core selection, this means that fi(v1) ≤ fj(v1) for all i, j ∈ N with fi(v1) >
fi(v). This implies that fi(v1) = fi(v) > ξ1 for all i ∈ R1, and fi(v1) = ξ1 for all i ∈ N \R1.





γ̂vi ≥ v(S) = v1(S).
In particular,
∑
i∈S fi(v1) > v1(S) for all S ⊂ N with S ∩ R1 6= ∅. This contradicts that f
satisfies egalitarian core selection. Hence, maxi∈N fi(v) ≤ maxi∈N γ̂vi . For all i ∈ Q1 and all

















. Suppose that maxi∈N\Qk fi(v) > maxi∈N\Qk γ̂
v
i . Define Rk+1 ∈ 2N \ {∅, N}









< ξk+1 < max
i∈N\Qk
fi(v).
Define vk+1 ∈ TUN by
vk+1(S) =
{∑
i∈Rk+1 fi(v) + |N \Rk+1|ξk+1 if S = N ;
v(S) otherwise.
Then vk+1(N) > v(N). By aggregate monotonicity, f(vk+1) ≥ f(v). Moreover, fi(vk+1) >





fj(v) ≥ v(S) = vk+1(S).
By egalitarian core selection, this means that fi(vk+1) ≤ fj(vk+1) for all i, j ∈ N with
fi(vk+1) > fi(v). This implies that fi(vk+1) = fi(v) > ξk+1 for all i ∈ Rk+1, and fi(vk+1) =





γ̂vi ≥ v(S) = vk+1(S).
In particular,
∑
i∈S fi(vk+1) > vk+1(S) for all S ⊂ N with S ∩ (Rk+1 \Qk) 6= ∅. This con-
tradicts that f satisfies egalitarian core selection. Hence, maxi∈N\Qk fi(v) ≤ maxi∈N\Qk γ̂vi .














We are interested in the maximal subclass of balanced games on which aggregate mono-
tonicity and egalitarian core selection are compatible. Note that aggregate monotonicity
and egalitarian core selection are compatible on any domain consisting of one single bal-
anced game, and any such domain is included in an inclusion-wise maximal one. Formally,
we are interested in a domain which is closed under increment of the worth of the grand
coalition and inclusion-wise maximal in terms of compatibility of aggregate monotonicity and
egalitarian core selection. This is the class of egalitarian stable games, where the procedural
egalitarian solution satisfies coalitional monotonicity and strong egalitarian core selection.
Lemma 3.2
The procedural egalitarian solution satisfies coalitional monotonicity on the class of egalitar-
ian stable games.
Proof. Let v, v′ ∈ TUNes and let S ∈ 2N be such that v(S) ≤ v′(S) and v(T ) = v′(T ) for all
T ∈ 2N \ {S}. First, we show by induction that for all k ∈ N, γv
′,k







if S /∈ Av′,k. For all i ∈ P v′,1 and all T ∈ Âv with i ∈ T such that γ̂vi ≤ γ̂vj











This means that γv
′,1
S ≥ γ̂vS if S ∈ Av



















Let k ∈ N and assume that γv
′,k






if S /∈ Av′,k.











. For all i ∈ P v′,k+1 \ P v′,k and all T ∈ Âv with i ∈ T such that γ̂vi ≤ γ̂vj for


















|T \ P v′,k|
≥ γ̂vi .
This means that γv
′,k+1
S ≥ γ̂vS if S ∈ Av





























S ≥ γ̂vS = PESS(v).




The procedural egalitarian solution coincides with the Lmax solution on the class of egali-
tarian stable games.
Proof. Let v ∈ TUNes . Denote x = PES(v). Define R0 = ∅ and Rk = {i ∈ N | ∀j∈N\Rk−1 :
xj ≤ xi} for all k ∈ N. Then Rk−1 ⊆ Rk for all k ∈ N and Rk = N for all k ≥ |N |. Let
y ∈ C(v). Let k ∈ N and assume that yi = xi for all i ∈ Rk−1. Let i ∈ Rk \ Rk−1 and let





















This means that yj > xj for some j ∈ S or yj = xj for all j ∈ S. In general, yi > xi for
some i ∈ Rk \ Rk−1 or yi = xi for all i ∈ Rk \ Rk−1. This means that there does not exist
a k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} such that (−y)k > (−x)k and (−y)` = (−x)` for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Hence, the procedural egalitarian solution coincides with the Lmax solution on the class of
egalitarian stable games.
Theorem 3.2
The maximal domain2 on which aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selection are
compatible is the class of egalitarian stable games.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies aggregate
monotonicity and egalitarian core selection on the class of egalitarian stable games.
Let TUN be a domain of games which is closed under increment of the worth of the grand
coalition and on which aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selection are compatible.
Let f : TUN → RN be a solution satisfying aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core






This means that N ∈ Âv, so v is egalitarian stable. Hence, TUN ⊆ TUNes.
On the class of convex games, the Lmin solution, the Lmax solution, the least squares
solution, and the coalitional Nash solution all coincide with the coalitional monotonic Dutta
and Ray (1989) solution. On the class of equal division stable games, the Lmin solution,
the Lmax solution, the least squares solution, and the coalitional Nash solution all coin-
cide with the coalitional monotonic equal division solution. On the full class of egalitarian
stable games, only the Lmax solution coincides with the coalitional monotonic procedural
egalitarian solution.
Example 7






v(S) + 4 if S = {1, 2, 3, 4};
v(S) otherwise.
Then Lmin(v) = Lmax(v) = LS(v) = CN(v) = (7, 7, 7, 7). This means that the Lmin
solution, the least squares solution, and the coalitional Nash solution do not satisfy aggregate
monotonicity on the class of egalitarian stable games. 4
2i.e. the inclusion-wise maximal domain of games which is closed under increment of the worth of the
grand coalition
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In fact, aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selection characterize the Lmax
solution on the class of egalitarian stable games.
Theorem 3.3
The Lmax solution is the unique solution for egalitarian stable games satisfying aggregate
monotonicity and egalitarian core selection.
Proof. The Lmax solution satisfies strong egalitarian core selection on the class of egalitarian
stable games. By Lemma 3.3, the Lmax solution coincides with the procedural egalitarian
solution on the class of egalitarian stable games. By Lemma 3.2, this means that the Lmax
solution satisfies coalitional monotonicity on the class of egalitarian stable games.
Let f : TUNes → RN be a solution for egalitarian stable games satisfying aggregate
monotonicity and egalitarian core selection. Let v ∈ TUNes. By Lemma 3.1, f(v) = γ̂v. Then
Lemma 3.3 implies that
f(v) = γ̂v = PES(v) = Lmax(v).
Hence, f = Lmax.
Corollary 3.4
The Lmax solution is the unique solution for egalitarian stable games satisfying coalitional
monotonicity and strong egalitarian core selection.
The equal division solution satisfies coalitional monotonicity on the class of egalitarian stable
games, but does not satisfy egalitarian core selection. The Lmin solution, the least squares
solution, and the coalitional Nash solution satisfy strong egalitarian core selection on the
class of egalitarian stable games, but do not satisfy aggregate monotonicity. This means
that the properties in Theorem 3.3 are independent and remain independent when aggregate
monotonicity is strengthened to coalitional monotonicity, and egalitarian core selection is
strengthened to strong egalitarian core selection, as in Corollary 3.4.
The characterization of the Lmax solution is essentially valid on any subdomain of egal-
itarian stable games which is closed under increment of the worth of the grand coalition,
including the class of convex games and the class of equal division stable games. Another
such subdomain of egalitarian stable games is the class of large core games.
Large core
v ∈ TUN is a large core game if for all x ∈ RN with
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N , there
exists a y ∈ C(v) such that y ≤ x.
Theorem 3.5
All large core games are egalitarian stable.3




i ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N , there









This means that y = γ̂v, so N ∈ Âv. Hence, v is egalitarian stable.
The egalitarian stable game in Example 2 is not a large core game, so the class of egalitarian
stable games strictly includes the class of large core games.
3In fact, in large core games, all aspirations are core elements.
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the compatibility of aggregate monotonicity and egalitarian core selec-
tion for solutions for transferable utility games. The maximal domain on which these axioms
are compatible is the class of egalitarian stable games, i.e. games for which the procedural
egalitarian solution selects from the core. On this class, these axioms characterize the Lmax
solution, which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity and strong egalitarian core selection.
The Lmax solution and the procedural egalitarian solution coincide if and only if the un-
derlying game is egalitarian stable. For games which are not egalitarian stable, aggregate
monotonicity and egalitarian core selection are incompatible and there is a trade-off. The
Lmax solution satisfies egalitarian core selection on the full class of balanced games, but sat-
isfies aggregate monotonicity only on the class of egalitarian stable games. The procedural
egalitarian solution satisfies aggregate monotonicity on the class of all games, but satisfies
egalitarian core selection only on the class of egalitarian stable games. This consideration is
up to the decision maker.
The class of egalitarian stable games not only contains the class of convex games and
the class of equal division stable games, but also the class of large core games. Biswas et al.
(1999) showed that all exact games (cf. Schmeidler (1972)) with at most four players are
large core games. Estévez-Fernández (2012) showed that all stable core games with at most
five players are large core games. This means that all exact games with at most four players
and all stable core games with at most five players are egalitarian stable. On the other hand,
the egalitarian stable game with four players in Example 2 is neither an exact game, nor a
stable core game. Whether all exact games and all stable core games with an arbitrary num-
ber of players are egalitarian stable is an interesting open question for future research. This
would contribute to a better understanding of the compatibility of aggregate monotonicity
and egalitarian core selection.
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